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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

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State Department review completed

17 September 1970

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Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A017100110001-9

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Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A017100110001-9

No. 0223/70
17 September 1970

Central Intelligence Bulletin

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[JORDAN: The fedayeen's refusal to begin carrying out its 15 September agreement with the government could induce King Husayn to move.

One of the first acts of the new military government was the appointment of representatives to continue talks with the fedayeen under the auspices of the five-nation Arab mediating committee, which had been instrumental in negotiating the latest agreement. Yesterday, however, the chairman of the mediating committee conveyed the answer of the fedayeen central committee to the government. The fedayeen, he said, believe that it is impossible to implement the recent agreements "at the present time" and have renounced their obligation to do so without giving any reason.

The mediating committee called for an immediate meeting of the Arab League to consider the new situation. In a statement over Amman radio yesterday afternoon, the Jordanian Government said that it will not tolerate any disturbances or unjustified provocations, and that it holds the fedayeen central committee responsible "for everything which may arise out of its negative attitude."

Fedayeen Actions

The fedayeen have taken several steps in reaction to the appointment of the new government. The central committee ordered the immediate unification of all Palestinian regular, commando, and militia forces under the leadership of Yasir Arafat. According to a Fatah spokesman in Beirut, Arafat called in Arab ambassadors to Amman to tell them that the "resistance movement" would defend itself against Jordan's new "fascist military regime" until the regime is ousted and a national government set up. Several areas in downtown Amman have been fortified with sandbags and roadblocks. The federation of Jordanian labor unions has issued a call for a general strike today. Arafat does seem to be anxious to]

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[prevent the situation from escalating, however; he has ordered the fedayeen not to fire on any military positions unless they are fired on first, although they are to repulse any attempt by the army to overrun fedayeen positions.

The fedayeen will probably use tactics of passive resistance against the government and wait for the regime's next move. For its part, the government is probably also not altogether clear on its plans. Despite the severity of his latest step, the King has gone out of his way to reassure the Palestinians. Brigadier Daud, the new prime minister, is of Palestinian origin with a reputation as a moderate and a conciliator; the new chief of the royal court is also a Palestinian, and known hard-liners have been excluded from the cabinet.]

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[Although both sides are probably closer to an all-out confrontation than ever before, there are signs that both still hope to avoid a showdown.

Amman seems to have been generally quiet, although extremely tense, yesterday. There were reports of fighting in Zarqa, however, and newsmen have told US Embassy officials that all of Irbid except for one police post seemed to be in the hands of the fedayeen.

Negotiations on the Hostages

The British, in particular, are growing increasingly nervous over the fate of the hostages in view of the dangerous security situation in Amman. At the meeting of the Bern group yesterday, the UK representative said that the five nations had to agree on a negotiating mandate which would include]

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C a contribution by Israel going beyond the release of the two Algerians. Otherwise, he said, the UK might be forced to seek "other solutions." The imminent arrival in Amman of two new Red Cross representatives may help restore some momentum to the negotiations, but their role has been complicated by the announcement of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) that it will deal with the Red Cross only on an individual country-by-country basis, not as representing the whole Bern group. A confrontation between the Jordanian Government and the fedayeen could induce the PFLP to use the hostages as pawns in maneuvering against the regime.

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
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Current Situation



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CAMBODIA: Government reinforcements have reached the Cambodian Army task force along Route 6, but the Communists are maintaining the pressure.

Latest reports indicate that two battalions joined the main column on 14 September and that the Cambodians repaired a key bridge to the south on 15 September. According to press reports, however, the enemy has now moved in behind the government column, occupying a village between Tang Kauk and Skoun. These reports have not been confirmed, however.

There is mounting evidence that elements of the Viet Cong 275th Regiment are involved in the fighting. Documents to this effect were found on the bodies of enemy troops.

In the northwest, there are reports of Communist attacks in Battambang Province, which until recently was free of significant enemy activity. The Communists overran and occupied two government outposts between 20 and 30 miles northeast of Battambang city on 13 September.

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THAILAND - NORTH VIETNAM: Hanoi apparently is ready to resume negotiations with Bangkok on the repatriation of some 40,000 Vietnamese refugees still in northeast Thailand.

The Thai Foreign Ministry has confirmed press reports that North Vietnamese Red Cross officials are scheduled to arrive in Vientiane on 25 September on their way to Bangkok to begin bilateral discussions on the repatriation question. The Thai Red Cross reportedly has asked the Interior Ministry to guarantee safe passage for Hanoi's negotiating team.

The original agreements to repatriate the Vietnamese, who fled to Thailand during the fighting in the early 1950s, resulted in the relocation of more than 40,000 to North Vietnam. The agreements were suspended on Hanoi's initiative in 1964, ostensibly because US bombing rendered refugee transportation through the Gulf of Tonkin unsafe and refugee resettlement problems too difficult.

Thai efforts to impose tighter security on the Vietnamese community, long considered a subversive threat, and the deportation of some Communist cadre to South Vietnam may have contributed to Hanoi's apparent decision to reopen talks. Hanoi, moreover, probably wants to pre-empt additional Thai moves against the Vietnamese community. The North Vietnamese may also hope to reopen repatriation offices in the northeast, from which they can exert greater influence and control over the Vietnamese community and engage in intelligence gathering and other covert activities.

Hanoi probably does not intend to repatriate many of the refugees; the regime encountered considerable trouble in reconciling the refugees it

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brought back earlier in the decade to the austere-
ties of life in North Vietnam. Even if Hanoi fol-
lows through, however, the negotiations will prob-
ably be complicated and any actual repatriation
a slow process. There is no evidence that either
Hanoi or Bangkok views possible repatriation talks
as an opportunity to discuss wider problems. [redacted]

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NORTH VIETNAM - JAPAN: Trade is expected to drop sharply this year, but Hanoi is looking for Japanese assistance to modernize its coal industry.

An official of the Japan-Vietnam Trade Association estimates that total trade between the two countries this year will amount to only about half the \$13.3 million of trade recorded in 1969. The principal reason for the slump is the failure of North Vietnam to meet the delivery schedule for coal. As of the beginning of August, only about half of the coal scheduled for export to Japan during the first seven months had been shipped.

Traditionally, coal production falls off during the summer because of bad weather. It may rise during the last quarter of this year, but a sustained increase in output is unlikely until management is improved, modern equipment is installed, and labor productivity is increased.

A North Vietnamese economic delegation that recently visited Japan suggested a barter arrangement under which coal-mining technology and equipment to modernize the Hon Gai coal mines would be obtained in exchange for future shipments of coal. Japanese visitors to these coal fields in early 1970 forecast dismal prospects for increased coal production until North Vietnam replaces its archaic mine equipment and modernizes coal transport and processing facilities.

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PHILIPPINES: The capture of a leading Huk commander will provide the Marcos government a propaganda plum but will not significantly ease the security situation in central Luzon.

Faustino del Mundo, who uses the pseudonym of Commander Sumulong, was picked up on 16 September. He is being taken to Manila where President Marcos will presumably exhibit him as proof of the administration's progress in reversing the deteriorating law and order situation.

Sumulong, formerly the leading Huk commander, has been eclipsed in recent years by the growth of a rival Huk organization under Bernabe Buscayno, known as Commander Dante. Sumulong has concentrated on racketeering, and his interest in profit-making has erased any ideological content his movement might once have had. Dante, on the other hand, professes to be a Maoist. Although there is considerable doubt about his understanding of and commitment to Communism, he is backed by elements of the illegal Philippine Communist Party, which in recent months has shown signs of reviving.

Dante's forces number about 300, compared with Sumulong's armed strength of only about 100. Sumulong's removal from the scene will not appreciably reduce Huk influence and terrorism in rural areas of central Luzon, inasmuch as his followers will continue their banditry. [redacted]

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NOTES

USSR - COMMUNIST CHINA: Moscow announced yesterday the appointment of Leningrad party chief Vasily Tolstikov as ambassador to Peking, but gave no indication when he will actually take up his post. Several weeks ago the Chinese ended four months of footdragging by accepting Tolstikov, but Peking has not yet disclosed its own plans for the appointment of an ambassador to Moscow. The Soviets probably view the announcement of Tolstikov's appointment as complementing their less abrasive attitude toward the Chinese; they probably judge that the onus now is on Peking to reciprocate.

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USSR-PERU: A Soviet cargo ship is en route to Peru with at least 2,000 tons of relief goods, including foodstuffs, prefabricated building materials, and construction equipment. Moscow had announced earlier that aid not delivered following the cancellation of the airlift would be shipped by sea. Only 21 flights were completed of the planned 65, but one additional flight, probably carrying urgently needed medical supplies, was made. Considerably more Soviet aid is now en route than the 700 tons that would have been transported by the 65 flights.

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BOLIVIA: Clashes between the army and guerrillas of the pro-Cuban Army of National Liberation (ELN) are occurring with greater frequency. In fighting on 12 and 13 September there were at least eight guerrilla casualties while the armed forces suffered four. Despite the Bolivian military's poor state of preparedness, operations north of La Paz in the past seven weeks have resulted in the death or capture of nearly half of the guerrillas that participated in the raid on a mining encampment on 19 July. The increasing incidence of clashes suggests that the army's net is slowly being drawn around the ELN group.

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LIBYA: Yesterday's cabinet changes have strengthened military control over the government and have confirmed Major Huni as number three man after Colonel Qaddafi and Major Jallud. When the cabinet was formed last January, civilians outnumbered members of the military Revolutionary Command Council; in the new cabinet, council members now form a majority, and the civilian foreign minister has been replaced by a council member. Major Jallud, reportedly Qaddafi's chief rival, retains his title of deputy prime minister, but he no longer controls the internal security forces as minister of interior. This job has been given to Major Huni, who has also been named a deputy prime minister.

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CONGO (KINSHASA): A cabinet reshuffle, announced shortly after President Mobutu's return last weekend from a six-week foreign tour, switches ten portfolios without ousting a single minister. This is the first extensive reshuffle since the dismissal of several prominent figures from the cabinet in August 1969 and may be intended largely to keep ranking administrators on their mettle. Mobutu's retention of the defense and foreign affairs portfolios provides fresh evidence of his reluctance to delegate key responsibilities.

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NORTH AFRICA: The brief meeting of the heads of state of Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria on 14 September at a Mauritanian town close to Spanish Sahara seems to have been largely a public relations gesture to dramatize the Spanish Saharan issue. Apparently, no firm agreements were concluded during the 90-minute meeting, but a tripartite policy coordinating committee was set up and the three leaders decided to confer again. This demonstration of solidarity is likely to be the prelude to a new attempt to get the UN General Assembly to call for an early plebiscite to determine the political future of the sparsely populated but mineral-rich territory.

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